Gas monetisation intricacies:evidence from Indonesia by Hakam, Dzikri & Asekomeh, Ayodele
                                                              
University of Dundee
Gas monetisation intricacies
Hakam, Dzikri
Published in:
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Hakam, D. (2018). Gas monetisation intricacies: evidence from Indonesia. International Journal of Energy
Economics and Policy, 8(2), 174-181.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2018
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 2 • 2018174
International Journal of Energy Economics and 
Policy
ISSN: 2146-4553
available at http: www.econjournals.com
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 2018, 8(2), 174-181.
Gas Monetisation Intricacies: Evidence from Indonesia
Dzikri Firmansyah Hakam1,2*, Ayodele O. Asekomeh3
1Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law, and Policy. University of Dundee, Scotland, United Kingdom, 2PT. PLN 
(Persero), Jakarta, Indonesia, 3Department of Accounting and Finance, Aberdeen Business School, Robert Gordon University, 
United Kingdom. *Email: d.f.hakam@dundee.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Indonesia’s geographical spread as an archipelago results in a unique and sophisticated electricity distribution. Consequently, PLN, Indonesia’s state-
owned electricity company, faces several challenges in implementing a robust gas monetisation scheme given these peculiar features of Indonesia’s 
electricity sector. We identify and evaluate the risks and critical issues regarding Indonesia’s gas monetisation policy formulation and implementation, 
particularly the changing regulation and reforms of the past three decades. We surmise that a sound energy policy of gas investment and utilisation by 
PLN and other energy stakeholders is fundamental. This will manifest in sound business strategies, especially in addressing contractual difficulties 
and infrastructural deficiencies in securing long-term gas supplies for gas power plants. Some positive approaches are already being adopted by the 
Indonesian electricity sector stakeholders to tackle the challenges in gas transportation like small scale liquefied natural gas (LNG), marine LNG and 
compressed natural gas but these efforts need to be consistently pursued over the planning horizon.
Keywords: Gas Monetisation, Long-term Gas Supplies, Gas Transportation 
JEL Classifications: L95, N7, Q4
1. INTRODUCTION
Selected studies (Bacon, 1995; Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001; 
Fraser, 2003) have identified the principal driving forces behind 
electricity sector reforms. The first is the poor performance 
of state-run electricity sectors, including the inability to meet 
electricity demand. There is also the inability of state-owned 
electricity utility companies to finance infrastructure projects. 
Governments often grant energy subsidies, which burden or inhibit 
fiscal policy. Thus, the removal of such subsidies is widely seen 
as an essential reform-enabler. Additionally, reforms provide 
governments with an opportunity to gain immediate revenue from 
selling electricity assets. However, reforms are unsurprisingly 
challenging to implement since policies need to be contextualised 
for an adopting country’s peculiar circumstances.
In this study, we examine the risks and challenges for achieving the 
electrification targets for Indonesia. The country is characterised 
by a growing demand for electricity across a vast archipelago, 
which poses severe infrastructural challenges, especially for gas 
transportation and monetisation. Thus, there is the need to examine 
the strategy for meeting growing demand for electricity where 
access to electricity was previously enshrined in the constitution 
in a manner that prevented the efficient allocation of resources. 
Reforms are pursued with the strong assumption that resources 
are usually efficiently allocated by market conditions and forces.
First, we review the changes in Indonesia’s electricity regulation 
and policy that have shaped the sector in the past three decades. 
Building on this, we examine the current energy mix of Indonesia 
and the task of the state-owned electricity company, PT PLN 
(Persero) or PLN, in providing electricity in a manner that seeks to 
satisfy constitutional requirements on the one hand and contracting 
obligations that are mostly arbitrated by the forces of supply and 
demand on the other. Next, given the projected energy mix and 
the vital role of gas in achieving Indonesia’s energy sustainability 
objectives, we examine the various gas monetisation schemes that 
PLN can consider and evaluate the issues surrounding securing 
gas supply contracts to ensure cost-efficient operations of existing 
and new gas-fueled power plants. Finally, we evaluate policy 
implications and draw proper conclusions for the Indonesian 
electricity sector.
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2. ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM AND 
POLICY
The electricity law of 1985 was a significant development in the 
electricity industry in Indonesia. The law allowed private parties 
to participate in Indonesia’s electricity supply business in limited 
capacities. The private participants acted as Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) and were restricted to generating electricity 
supply for PLN under Private Purchase Agreements (PPAs). The 
goals of the IPP program are to attract international investment, 
reduce electricity cost through competitiveness and assign project 
risks in a considered manner. The purposes of IPPs’ participation 
are to meet excess electricity demand and follow international 
financing trends (Lefevre and Todoc, 2000). However, countries 
adopting IPP arrangements have difficulty paying their financial 
obligation to the IPPs (Wamukonya, 2003) since the national utility 
company buys electricity from IPP in US$ and sells in domestic 
currency, e.g., the Indonesian Rupiah.
Indonesia’s IPP program was hindered by the Asian financial crisis 
in the late 1990s (PWC, 2011). Due to the financial crisis, the 
Indonesian government could not meet its financial obligations to 
IPPs as specified in partnership contracts. Moreover, PLN's inability 
to pay IPP's caused a delay in the take-off of a majority of the 
power plant infrastructure projects and resulted in massive debts 
to the IPPs over unresolved contracts. In 2002, the Indonesian 
government introduced new electricity reforms through the re-
enactment of the electricity law. Under the 2002 electricity law, 
private parties could participate in both the electricity supply 
business and the retail market, with electricity tariffs determined by 
the market under supervision by the electricity market supervisory 
agency.
However, in 2004, the Indonesia constitutional court invalidated 
the 2002 electricity law as it was deemed unconstitutional, 
reverting to the 1985 law. The Indonesian constitution considers 
electricity to be a social necessity that should be exclusively 
delivered by the state-owned company. In 2009, the Indonesian 
government passed Electricity Act No. 30, which embodies the 
main provisions of the 2002 electricity law in regards to the 
participation of private parties in the electricity supply business. 
Also, regional governments are now given a more prominent 
role in building infrastructure and determining electricity tariffs. 
According to Article No 4, Point 1 of Electricity Act No. 30, central 
and local governments are responsible for securing the electricity 
supply through state-owned electricity companies. The Act is also 
intended to guide the liberalisation of the electricity sector with 
the participation of private companies in the generation market 
(Article No 4, Point 2). IPPs and cooperatives play a significant 
role in Indonesia’s electricity sector since some of the power plant 
investments are financed and constructed by them.
The electricity sector liberalisation in Indonesia is partial since the 
private enterprise cannot enter the transmission and distribution 
sectors, which are exclusively operated by PLN. Transmission 
and distribution are performed by PLN transmission and PLN 
distribution respectively, both operating a PLN dispatch centre. 
The current law empowers PLN to play a leading role in the 
market, although private companies are progressively being 
given a more significant role in new power plant investments. 
Thus, of the 35,000 MW power plant investment expected in 
the next 5 years, PLN will construct 10.681 MW while private 
companies will account for 25,904 MW installed capacity (PLN, 
2015b). However, it is questionable whether a state-owned entity is 
equipped or able to operate autonomously and contract efficiently 
with other market participants. Indonesia’s National Energy Policy 
informs PLN’s corporate strategy. The strategies are focused on the 
final objective of delivering energy sustainability as can be seen in 
Figure 1. Indonesia’s energy stakeholders are interested in shifting 
the paradigm from supply-side policy to demand-side policy, 
securing energy supply through several strategies (such as new 
exploration and production and energy conservation), increasing 
consumer awareness of efficient utilisation of energy (by putting 
into operation energy conservation and diversification strategies), 
and increasing energy prices in order to remove energy subsidy 
and convert the energy subsidy to a direct subsidy for the poor.
Further details of Indonesia’s electricity policy can be found 
in (PLN, 2015b). Electricity policy was established to solve 
electricity supply deficit and support economic growth. Indonesia’s 
generation expansion planning is designed to provide reliable and 
sustainable electricity to the customer and focus on local and green 
energy sources. The general plan of electricity supply (RUPTL) 
is intended to implement the national mandate in government 
regulation No. 14 of 2012 that dictates that electricity supply 
business for public services should be undertaken solely by PLN 
through specified planning criteria. The plan revised some of the 
assumptions made in previous years report due to the delay in some 
power plants’ commercial operation dates (COD1s).
RUPTL is conducted based on the National Electricity Master Plan 
(RUKN) from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral, as can be seen 
in Figure 2. The electricity demand forecast is used as a basis for 
power generation planning and is supported by transmission and 
distribution planning. The optimisation principle in power plant 
development is to achieve the least cost and a reliable electricity 
supply for the consumer. The “go” versus “no-go” decision-
making in power plant projects is influenced by project investment 
valuation criteria, such as net present value (NPV), internal rate of 
return and environmental impact study (PLN, 2015b).
3. STATE OF INDUSTRY AND ENERGY MIX
PLN, Indonesia’s state-owned electricity company, has a social 
and political duty or Public Service Obligation (PSO) to support 
government targets in the country’s development by establishing 
sufficient power plants to meet high growth in electricity demand. 
Indonesia is one of the world’s emerging economies and is a member 
of the G-20 countries. Indonesia is projected to become the 7th largest 
economy in the world, overtaking Germany and the United Kingdom 
by 2030 (Oberman et al., 2012). A prerequisite for Indonesia’s high 
economic growth target is steady and rapid electrification for both 
domestic and industrial use (Oberman et al., 2012).
1 COD is the date from when a power plant starts delivering electricity 
energy to the consumer after rigorous technical tests.
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Figure 3 shows a breakdown of PLN’s forecasted energy mix from 
2015 to 2024. The figure indicates that coal fuel is vital to the 
energy mix. Coal-fueled power plants have a high capacity factor 
characteristic (usually close to 100%) due to coal’s use as the base 
load in the power system. Typically, the Indonesia power system, 
e.g., the Java power system, uses steam coal and geothermal units 
for the base load, gas combined cycle units for the intermediate load, 
and oil-fired combustion turbine and peaking hydropower units for 
the peak load (Rachmatullah et al., 2007). Gas is the second largest 
fuel in the mix. The importance of gas in Indonesia’s energy mix is 
mainly due to the flexibility of gas-fueled power plants for use in 
adjusting peak load demand. PLN’s gas monetisation consists of 
natural gas, compressed gas and liquefied gas and is correlated with 
oil fuel utilisation decline in the future. Electricity production from 
gas is projected at approximately 95,000 GWH by 2024. Natural 
gas utilisation is expected to reduce (dropping by 3% during the 
2015–2024 period) in the future, to be replaced by the increasing use 
of compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
(e.g., the LNG portion will increase by 75% in the same period).
However, Figure 3 also indicates that renewable energy is not as 
significant as coal or gas in the mix. Nevertheless, the Indonesian 
government is committed to developing green energy in the form 
of hydro, solar, biomass and geothermal energy through energy 
policies like feed-in tariff (FIT)2.
2 Feed-in tariff is a policy mechanism designed to increase investment in 
renewable energy, e.g., wind and hydro. Tariff applied is a differential 
rate that allows investors to recover generation cost thereby encouraging 
PLN is the biggest company in Indonesia with assets value of more 
than 603 trillion rupiahs (PLN, 2015a), equivalent to US$48.39 
billion (2014 average currency; US$1 = 12,461 IDR). PLN has 
business segments covering electricity generation, transmission 
and distribution sectors. The main corporate expense is fuel costs. 
Based on the consolidated financial statements for 2001-2014, fuel 
expense as a percentage of total annual expenses ranged from 44% 
to 71%. Figure 4 indicates that PLN’s fuel expense is correlated 
with global oil prices.
Although oil-fueled power plants (MFO) are planned to account 
for only 1% of the total installed capacity by 2024 (PLN, 2015b), 
oil fuel expense represents a dominant part of total fuel expense 
(Figure 5). Also, crude oil price fluctuations affect the cost to the 
company. Regarding demand, Indonesia’s electricity system is 
currently dominated by residential consumers, but load3 factors 
(80% in 2013) and electrification ratios4 (80.5% in 2013) are 
still a long way from set targets (Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources Republic of Indonesia, 2014). PLN utilises existing 
peaking load power plants, including diesel power plants (HFD), 
to meet peak demands.
The optimum peaking load power plant with high ramping rate5 
and a short period of project investment that could replace diesel 
power plants would be gas-fueled power plants. Development of 
pumped storage power plants takes such a long time to construct 
that it is not suitable given the high electricity demand in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, the high capital cost of a hydro project that produces 
a lower return on investment (ROI) leads investors to prefer gas 
power plants.
4. GAS MONETISATION 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR INDONESIA
It is expected that world energy demand will be dominated by 
three primary sources: Oil, gas and coal fuel (BP, 2015). Of the 
three, gas is the cleanest fuel and delivers the cheapest process 
cost in the power generation sector (Fraser, 2003). Natural 
gas utilisation in the electricity industry is a necessity, and its 
percentage in the power system energy mix is increasing in many 
countries (Fernandes et al., 2005; Shukla et al., 2009). However, 
gas power plant utilisation in Indonesia power system is limited 
to intermediate and peaking load since it is less competitive for 
baseload power plants compared to coal, hydro and geothermal 
power plants. Furthermore, gas monetisation is hampered by the 
primary challenge of transporting the gas to the scattered load of 
Indonesia’s archipelago. This transportation constraint is shaping 
investment in renewables. FITs are set to decline over time to monitor and 
stimulate technological cost reductions. See Couture and Yves (2010) for 
further explanation.
3 Load factor (LF) is the ratio between average load and peak load. This ratio 
is important in determining power plant utilisation in each power system, 
e.g., proportion of base to peak power plants in the energy mix.
4 Electrification ratio is a comparison between households with electricity 
access and total household number (in percentage).
5 Ramping rate is the amount of load the power plant operator could add per 
unit of time. High ramping power plants respond flexibly to sudden load 
increase in the power system.
Figure 1: National Energy Policy adapted from (Sutijastoto, 2012)
Figure 2: General plan of electricity supply process
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the development of the market and commodity trading in natural 
gas (Khalilpour and Karimi, 2012).
Gas monetisation alternatives like CNG, LNG, GTL (gas to 
liquid) and GTW (gas to wire) are used to address the natural 
gas transportation challenges. Of these, LNG and CNG use are 
predominant (Khalilpour and Karimi, 2012). The process of LNG 
production and delivery consists of several stages including gas 
exploration, pipeline operation, natural gas liquefaction, gas 
storage and transportation, terminal storage, and regasification. 
In the liquefaction stage, the natural gas feed is condensed and 
stored in atmospheric tanks. The condensed gas, in the form of 
LNG, is then shipped in specially designed containers. The LNG 
is then unloaded into storage tanks, re-gasified and supplied to 
the customer and gas power plant (Khalilpour and Karimi, 2012).
The first world-scale LNG project resulted in LNG sales 
from Indonesia to Japan in the 1970s. This LNG project was 
characterised by a high degree of government involvement and 
a long-term gas take-or-pay (TOP) contract based on sales and 
specified purchase agreements for selected buyers (Griffin, 2006). 
On the other hand, the CNG utilisation process consists of three 
different stages: Compression, transportation and decompression 
of natural gas. In the compression stage, the natural gas is chilled 
to a lower temperature, which makes it easier to compress. In the 
transportation stage, the natural gas is transported using specially 
designed containers, which are vertically or horizontally stacked. 
Finally, in the decompression stage, natural gas is heated to the 
desired temperature and the decompressed gas released into the 
delivery terminal.
Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement (GSPA) is a long-term sales 
commitment or contract between the gas seller and a buyer. The 
essential stipulation of the GSPA is the take-or-pay (TOP) clause 
(Masten and Crocker, 1985). Gas investments are very sensitive 
to gas prices and require a substantial initial capital outlay. Hence, 
the TOP clause reduces the investment risk for the gas investor 
since buyers have to pay for a contractually determined minimum 
volume, even if gas delivery is not taken. Since the buyer could 
suffer losses if they cannot use all of the gas, it is vital to calculate 
gas consumption accurately. The most significant gas purchasers 
are gas power plants. Thus plant operators should carefully 
examine gas requirements (Dong et al., 2012).
Where a gas power plant is utilised as a baseload power plant, 
the TOP clause will not be a problem for the operator. However, 
where the gas power plant is used for managing load variability 
in the power system, such as in Indonesia, the rigidity of TOP 
will reduce the operational flexibility of gas power units. Masten 
and Crocker (1985) and Dong et al. (2012) suggest flexibility in 
long-term gas contracts to reduce the investment risk for the buyer. 
However, this will lead to an increased risk for the natural gas 
Figure 3: Indonesia power system fuel mix 2015-2024 (PLN, 2015b)
Figure 4: Oil price and PLN’s total fuel expense. Data source: (BP, 
2015; PLN, 2015a)
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supplier. Moreover, an accurate system dispatching for gas power 
plant will reduce the losses incurred as a result of the TOP clause.
A gas-fueled power plant is flexible for use in high ramping type 
power plants that can adjust electricity production according to 
demand in the short-run. This characteristic is important, especially 
in countries with liberalised electricity sectors (Fraser, 2003). Fraser 
(2003)  reports that gas monetisation in the world’s power generation 
has been around 65% since 1991. In addition to load flexibility, gas-
fueled power plants offer the investor the ability to hedge financial 
risk and have the advantage of lower CO
2
 emissions (EIA, 2010).
The preceding create some special corporate considerations for 
Indonesia’s power system. Firstly, Indonesia’s geographical spread 
as the world’s biggest archipelago naturally creates a scattered load, 
with many isolated islands. The power system consists of several 
individual power systems dominated by residential consumers 
with different load factors. The lower the load ratio, the larger the 
difference between base and peak loads, which then increases the 
need for gas-fueled power plants. The different power systems in 
Indonesia’s electricity sector and their average load factor projections 
for 2015 and 2024 are given in Table 1. It is essential to provide 
sufficient must-run peaking power plants, such as gas-fueled power 
plants, to respond to the sudden shifting from base load to peak load, 
especially in power system interconnections with low load factors.
The national electrification ratio for Indonesia has increased 
significantly, rising from 60.8% in 2007 to 80.5% in the year 2013 
(Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Republic of Indonesia, 
2014). The Indonesian government is committed to further 
developing the electricity infrastructure to increase electricity 
access to the consumer. New generation infrastructure needs to be 
combined with the utilisation of all existing power plant capacity, 
including plants using high-cost fuel types such as diesel.
Indonesia currently has proven gas reserves of approximately 
103 Tcf (trillion standard cubic feet) or about 3 million cubic 
meters, which represents 1.4% of total world gas reserves 
BP (2015). Indonesia exports natural gas to countries like the 
United Kingdom, Japan and China, thus reemphasising Indonesia’s 
role in the world gas market. Based on Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Resources Republic of Indonesia (2014), the total amount 
of Indonesia’s gas reserves is 152.9 Tcf, which comprises of proven 
reserves of 104.7 Tcf and potential reserves of 48.2 Tcf. The gas 
reserves are scattered across the Indonesian archipelago, with 
the main contributions being from Natuna Island (51 Tcf), South 
Sumatra (16 Tcf), and East Kalimantan (19 Tcf).
Figure 6 shows Indonesia’s historical natural gas reserves for 
2000–2013 in Tcf. Energy resource adequacy is essential to 
minimise market risk in securing electricity supply. Indonesia’s 
gas reserves experienced a degradation in 2000–2013 due to a lack 
of investment in gas exploration. Although the proven reserves 
increased from 95 to 101 Tcf, the total gas reserves declined from 
170 to 150 Tcf. Corresponding to the decrease in the total national 
gas reserve, the gas supply for PLN’s use will decline in the future, 
resulting in potential shortages for power plants.
To reduce the cost burden of diesel power plant utilisation, PLN 
implemented a number of policies, including gas monetisation to 
replace diesel power plants as peaking plants. Gas-fueled power 
plants utilise piped gas, LNG, CNG, marine CNG, marine LNG, 
mini scale LNG fuel, which are all considered to deliver a higher 
return on investment, NPV and shorter payback period compared 
to diesel-fueled and pumped storage power plants. Reduction of 
dependence on diesel has been made in phases, according to the 
CODs of ongoing new plant constructions. Similarly, to reduce oil 
utilisation in power generation, PLN has pursued a diversification 
away from oil.
Gas project development involves several risks and challenges. 
Based on the EIA report (EIA, 2014), there are several significant 
risks in power plant investment. Power plant risks include changes 
in construction costs, lead time, operational costs, and availability/
performance. Market risk relates to the variability of fuel cost, 
demand, competition, and electricity prices. Regulatory risks 
Figure 5: PLN fuel structural cost 2001-2014 (Billion USD)
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manifest as issues with market design, regulation of competition, 
and regulation of transmission. Policy risks relate to compliance 
with environmental standards, CO2 constraints, support for 
specific technologies, and energy efficiency. In addition to the 
power plant investment risks mentioned above, Bhattacharyya 
(2012) points out that several additional investment risks 
are peculiar to developing countries. Firstly, governments in 
developing countries have difficulty in attracting international 
investors, primarily due to poor pricing policies which lead to poor 
benefit investment. Secondly, the lack of transparency and weak 
governance in such countries increase the risk premium and cause 
international investors to be more reluctant to invest their money.
Regarding generation technology options, gas power plant 
technology is considered to deliver lower risk in the investment 
process compared to other generation technology types (EIA, 
2010). The risk factor that should be carefully assessed in 
gas power plant investment is a market risk, where resource 
inadequacy and fuel costs become significant issues. However, 
investment preference in Indonesia is from coal rather than gas 
power plants. This is because of the absence of carbon pricing 
arrangements and environmental costs. Thus, coal is cheaper and 
relatively easier to acquire than gas.
The main problem in gas utilisation in Indonesia power system 
is the insufficiency of natural gas sources for gas-fueled power 
plants. Oil is often used as a substitute for gas, but this leads to 
higher fuel costs. Also, the challenges in establishing gas supply 
in the future are due to the difficulties in setting up long-term gas 
contracts and the depletion of existing gas wells. Thus, there is a 
contradiction between the decline in future gas supplies for the 
PLN and the expectation that the future energy mix will have an 
increased role for gas power plants. Figure 7 shows the projected 
pattern of gas supply for Java and Sumatra and East Indonesia.
Another primary challenge in gas utilisation in Indonesia’s 
electricity sector is the lack of pipeline infrastructure to transport 
natural gas from gas wells to power plants. Investment in gas 
infrastructure has been meagre, with the bulk of the network 
concentrated around Java and Sumatra Islands while gas resources 
are spread over the archipelago. The lack of gas pipeline and 
supporting infrastructure lead investors to sell gas to foreign 
countries usually at a higher margin than can be obtained by 
delivering to the Indonesian market. To tackle these challenges 
regarding servicing scattered load demands, PLN is pioneering 
the implementation of Marine CNG/LNG in the region to deliver 
gas supply to scattered gas-fired power plants.
Investment in LNG and CNG power plants aims to avoid the risk 
of failing to secure electricity supply by solely relying on pipeline 
gas source. There is a need for targeted efforts from the electricity 
regulators to overcome the problem of gas supply decline and 
lack of gas infrastructure. Although PLN has already established 
construction planning of the Trans-Java gas pipeline on Java 
Island, the plan does not accommodate gas transportation from 
gas well sources since the dominant gas resource is located not 
on Java Island. However, there is a commitment from Indonesian 
stakeholders to build floating storage and regasification unit 
(FSRU) LNG facilities in Sumatra and Java Islands to support 
the diversification policy. The facilities are Lampung FSRU in 
Sumatra Island to supply gas power plants in the Sumatra power 
system; West Java FSRU in Java Island to supply plants in the 
Java power system, and Arun Re-gas facility in Aceh Province to 
secure electricity supply especially in North Sumatra. However, 
it is likely that these arrangements will result in higher prices 
compared to pipeline gas.
PLN gives priority to peak load non-oil fuel to answer the 
high electricity demand, especially at night. However, due to 
Table 1: Load Factor in Indonesia power system adapted 
from (PLN, 2015b)
No. Power system 
interconnection
LF 2015 (%) LF 2024 (%)
1 Java-Bali 79 80
2 Sumatra 69 77
3 Kalbar 66 66
4 Kalseltengtimra 67 68
5 South Sulawesi 68 69
6 North Sulawesi 68 73
Figure 6: Indonesia natural gas reserve 2000-2013 (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Republic of Indonesia, 2014)
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the generation deficiency in the system, PLN is constrained to 
firing the diesel plant in peak load. The merit order6 of peak load 
power plants in Indonesia’s electricity system is based on price 
and operational flexibilities and is configured as follows. First, 
hydropower plants comprised of pumped storage and runoff 
river7 power plant. Next, LNG and CNG gas-fueled power plants 
are considered and followed lastly by diesel power plants. The 
significance and benefits of CNG and LNG gas-fueled power 
plants accrue in conditions where there is uncertainty in field and 
pipe gas supply for combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power 
plants that lead to a decreasing role in filling the intermediate 
load. Subsequently, coal power plants switch roles from base 
load to intermediate load to substitute the CCGT role in the 
system. However, coal power plants are not flexible in adjusting 
the ramping rate to follow the load profile in the system and can 
cause severe power system problems.
Other approaches to gas monetisation by PLN are as follows. First, 
to meet electricity demand, especially in electricity deficit regions, 
PLN will continue to purchase gas supply from various sources, 
including buying natural gas in the form of marginal gas8 and flare 
gas9. Next, PLN seeks to convert any surplus gas into CNG to add 
value by deriving a fuel source that offers flexibility in controlling 
gas utilisation according to the merit order. For power plants located 
near to gas sources, some marine CNG projects are now operating, 
and some are under development. For much longer distances with 
a higher volume of potential supply, marine LNG projects are high 
on PLN’s priority. Thirdly, PLN is increasing mini LNG technology 
utilisation, mainly in eastern Indonesia where there is no pipeline 
infrastructure in the system. Lastly, to meet the target of additional 
2000 MW gas-fired power plants per year to be assigned as peaking 
6 Merit order is the way an electricity utility company ranks the available 
sources of energy according to their marginal cost. Power plants with the 
lowest marginal cost are the first to come online in order to produce and 
deliver electricity.
7 Run off river power plant is a type of hydro power plant whereby no water 
storage is provided. The generation technology only relies on the water 
flow from the river in order to produce electricity.
8 This is gas from marginal fields i.e., oil or gas field that is not economically 
viable to produce oil or gas. However, such field could become commercially 
viable if technological and economic conditions change favourably. In the 
case of Indonesia, access and remoteness are usually the main issues for 
marginal field developments.
9 This is raw natural gas produced as associated gas when oil is produced from 
the well site. Where a country lacks or has inadequate gas infrastructure, 
such gas is usually flared thus resulting in waste and environmental 
pollution.
units, PLN is undertaking feasibility studies for a temporary solution 
for a midstream facility, i.e. LNG shuttle and LNG floating storage. 
Many logistics options are being explored for additional gas power 
plants at distributed locations. In this regards, some commercial 
schemes need to be assessed to comply with the cabotage law for 
offshore vessels enacted since December 2013 in Indonesia.
The investment decisions of PLN and the IPPs with which it 
contracts highly depend on the long-term gas contracts, fuel 
price and the capacity factor of the power plants. Capacity factor 
influences the rate of revenue from investment since increasing 
the load factor offers an opportunity to recover the capital cost of 
power plants more quickly. However, increasing capacity factor 
also increases fuel, operating and maintenance costs. It is important 
to note that the primary consideration of private companies in 
power plant investment is profit, which heavily depends on the 
long-term contract in fuel price and the economic life of power 
plant operation. On the other hand, PLN’s consideration transcends 
profitability and focuses on securing the electrical energy needs 
of Indonesian consumers regardless of energy price.
The advantage to PLN of the availability of gas supply for gas-
fueled power plants does not always extend beyond the peak load 
time. The power system operator faces difficulty in operating 
power plants due to the take-or-pay (TOP) clauses with contractors. 
Thus, to abide by these clauses, the power system dispatcher would 
sometimes have to fire up gas power plants in the morning and 
afternoon for filling intermediate and base loads instead of firing 
up it’s cheaper coal power plants. TOP clauses require purchasers 
to pay for a contractually specified minimum quantity of gas, even 
if the purchasers do not utilise the gas or the delivery is not taken 
(Masten and Crocker, 1985). Thus, TOP clauses force PLN to incur 
additional costs by using more expensive gas instead of coal. If 
it chooses to run the coal power plants, it would still have to pay 
for unused gas, which leads to inefficiencies. The TOP contract 
delivers advantages for the company’s suppliers regarding risk 
hedging on gas delivery and an incentive to prevent competitors 
supplying gas to PLN. Regarding long-term gas contracts design, 
a study by Masten and Crocker (1985) suggests an incentive to 
provide flexibility is an important consideration. It is crucial for 
PLN negotiators to critically set long-term gas contracts that are 
suitable for Indonesia’s power system characteristics.
5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Indonesia will experience high electricity demand growth in the 
future at a rate of approximately 8.5% per annum. Securing the 
electricity supply is essential to meeting this high growth in energy 
demand to support Indonesia’s economic growth sustainably. 
Moreover, it is essential to building power plant infrastructure 
according to the schedule in the National Master Plan. Based on 
the future energy mix and the characteristics of gas power plants, 
gas monetisation plays a vital role in Indonesia’s electricity system.
The importance of gas utilisation in Indonesia’s power system is 
likely to increase in the future. PLN will be optimising CNG, LNG 
and mini LNG power plants to replace diesel power plants to meet 
load peaking power plant requirements. Modern gas generation 
Figure 7: Total Gas Supply for PLN, 2015–2024 (PLN, 2015b)
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technologies such as CNG, LNG and mini LNG power plants 
are beneficial to electricity operators for adopting a merit order 
system (in which fuel sources are selected according to the least 
cost principle) for managing variability in load. Also, gas power 
plant projects deliver a quick return on investment with higher 
profitability compared to any other generation technologies.
The gas utilisation and power plant infrastructure need substantial 
investment by the Indonesian government and international 
investors. However, several main challenges could hold back 
investment in gas power plants. Firstly PLN experiences difficulties 
in securing gas supplies from various sources because the gas 
supply for gas power plants is insufficient and will likely continue to 
decline in the future. Also, the company has difficulty in purchasing 
long-term gas contracts since the gas suppliers are often already 
tied to long-term contracts with other parties. The situation is also 
exacerbated by depletion of existing gas sources. Although there 
are abundant gas sources scattered in the Indonesian archipelago, 
PLN may not be able to secure required gas supply due to the lack 
of gas infrastructure, i.e., pipelines for natural gas, FSRUs and other 
gas supporting facilities. Furthermore, gas contractors and investors 
would arguably prefer to export/sell natural gas to foreign countries 
because of low domestic gas prices and infrastructure problems.
From the preliminary review, it is apparent that PLN is increasingly 
and will need to continue applying energy and gas policies to resolve 
the above challenges. One of the critical policies is the development 
of LNG and CNG technology to replace diesel power plants and 
absorb surplus gas. Supported by the Indonesian, government, IPPs 
and subsidiary companies, PLN is developing gas infrastructure 
in the form of gas pipelines, FSRU, CNG and LNG power plants 
and marines. The COD of power plants construction are usually 
delayed, which affects the return of investment in the project. 
Furthermore, there is uncertainty in the long-term gas supply 
contract to PLN, which creates a long-term planning risk. A review 
of PLN’s electricity generation plan and gas contract needs to be 
regularly carried out to minimise risk for international investors 
and to maintain consistency and continuity of plans. A sound and 
strict company policy regarding infrastructure construction and gas 
supply commitments are essential and fundamental.
Acknowledging that CNG and LNG power plant investment is 
mostly influenced by fuel cost and capacity factors, PLN should 
design suitable long-term gas contracts in the future. The capacity 
factor is subjective to power plant operation hours and is related to 
TOP contracts with the gas supplier. If the gas delivered through 
the TOP contract is higher than the gas amount needed by PLN’s 
gas power plants, then PLN will incur massive losses. Hence, the 
long-term gas contract should be congruent with the fuel input 
demands of the power system and energy mix planning scenarios. 
In contrast, a TOP contract for a lower amount of gas than needed 
in the power system will force PLN into utilising more oil fuel to 
avoid load curtailment and load shedding, thus increasing fuel cost. 
Furthermore, gas monetisation projects are sensitive to fuel cost, 
which is mostly affected by fuel heat rate, fuel price (i.e., gas and 
oil price), and power plant efficiency. For this reason, the technical 
purchasing ability of PLN to procure gas supply at a low price and 
high heat rate to achieve high-efficiency gas power plants is essential.
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